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1 E-workplace: Employers' and employees' perspectives 
 
 
 
The introduction of computers into the workplace has significantly changed the 
way in which employers conduct their business. The rapid deployment and 
infusion of e-communication technologies in the workplace have affected the 
way in which employees are expected to perform their duties. These devices 
have become a standard in modern society and employees are expected to be 
technologically able.  
 
Technology not only enhances productivity but it also provides an instant, "now" 
means of socialisation and interaction. Our physical world has become infused 
with e-communication technologies. Electronic communication paraphernalia, 
such as multi-functional mobile devices, palm tops and electronic organisers 
have altered modern communication patterns and social behaviour. E-
communication facilities link the office with the home and the home with the 
office. The border between office and home has become fuzzy as the office is 
wherever a notebook and a hotspot may be found. This seamless blend of the 
public and the private raises several difficult legal issues as far as the privacy of 
e-communications is concerned. The legitimacy of employees' expectations of 
privacy as far as the use of electronic communication technologies in the 
workplace is concerned has been debated extensively.1
                                            
* BA (Pret) LLB (Unisa) LLM (Pret) LLD (Pret), Professor of Intellectual Property Law at the 
University of South Africa. Research for this article has been completed during November 
2007." 
  
  
1  Refer in this regard to the articles by Collier 2002 ILJ 1743; Mischke 2001 Contemporary 
Labour Law 91-98; Mischke 2003 Contemporary Labour Law 71-80; Van Eck 2001 De 
Jure 364-368; McGregor 2004 SA Merc LJ 638-650; Dekker 2004 SA Merc LJ 622-637; 
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When computer equipment was still a novelty in offices, employers adopted a 
laisser-faire approach to employees' experimental use of these new 
technologies. Employees were encouraged to become comfortable and familiar 
with new technologies and to explore the World Wide Web.2 Two reasons have 
been cited for this laid-back approach. First, some employers thought that 
these employees would perform better and secondly, this informal approach 
was adopted because employers were ignorant of the inherent risk that 
information technology poses to their businesses.3
Employees' expectations to have access to the latest communication 
technologies and the user privileges that they have become accustomed to, 
accompany them to the office. Most employees do not give a second thought to 
the fact that they use the workplace's e-mail facilities also for private purposes. 
Furthermore, employees have definite expectations that their e-mail 
communications and surfing habits will be shrouded in a veil of privacy.
  
 
4
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 guarantees an 
individual's right to privacy. This right to privacy includes the right of an 
individual not to have the privacy of her communications infringed.
  
 
5
The right to privacy in the context of the employment relationship is difficult to 
define or to elucidate.
 In terms of 
section 36 of the Constitution all rights may be limited.  
 
6
The rights that a citizen is entitled to in his or her personal life cannot simply 
disappear in his or her professional life as a result of the employer's business 
necessity. At the same time the employer's business necessity might legitimately 
 As noted in the Moonsamy case: 
 
                                                                                                                               
Beech 2005 ILJ 650-660; Le Roux "Employment" 1-10; Van Jaarsveld 2004 SA Merc LJ 
651-666; Cohen 2001 SAJIC 1-10. 
2  See McGregor (n1) 644. 
3  Ibid 644-645. 
4  See Gouws v Score/Price & Pride Furnishers 2001 11 BALR 1155 (CCMA); Philander v 
CSC Computer Sciences [2002] 3 BALR 304 (CCMA); Dauth and Brown v Wier's Cash N 
Carry 2002 23 ILJ 1272 (CCMA).  
5  See s 14(6) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (the Constitution). See 
Cohen (n 1) 6-12; Mischke 2003 Contemporary Labour Law 72-76. 
6  Moonsamy v The Mailhouse (1999) 20 ILJ 464 (CCMA) at 469I; Dekker (n 1) 626; 
McGregor (n1) 639-640. 
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impact on the employee's personal rights in a manner not possible outside the 
workplace. Therefore there is a clear balancing of interests.7
In Protea Technology v Wainer
 
8 the court held that a person's right to privacy 
extends to situations in respect of which a legitimate expectation of privacy 
could be harboured.9 However, this subjective expectation of privacy should be 
viewed as objectively reasonable by society.10 In the Protea Technology case 
taped telephonic conversations made by the employee relating to the 
employer's affairs did not enjoy Constitutional protection.11
It is in this context that Le Roux
  
 
However, employees fail to fully appreciate the overlapping and interrelated 
rights that are at play here. Viewed from the employer's perspective, it may be 
argued that privacy is not an absolute right. Employees' right to privacy should 
be balanced with the employer's business necessities or operational 
requirements. It should be kept in mind that the employer provides and owns 
the computer facilities the employee uses. Furthermore, the employer has a 
right to control the working life of the employee. The employer also has a right 
to protect her business interests and the integrity of her computing equipment 
against viruses, excessive use and "cyber loafing", which implies the 
employee's omission to do assigned work.  
 
12
The Labour Relations Act
 notes: 
 
The employer is also permitted to set more general standards relating to conduct 
in the work place and to the use of equipment and tools. The employer can, for 
example, prescribe when personal computers may be used, for what purposes 
they may be used, and how they may be used. The same applies to access to the 
Internet. If an employee fails to comply with these rules it will, in principle, be open 
to the employer to discipline an employee for such a failure. In the correct 
circumstances this may also justify the disciplinary sanction of dismissal. 
 
13 and Code of Good Practice14
                                            
7  Moonsamy v The Mailhouse (1999) 20 ILJ 464 (CCMA) at 471G. 
8  Protea Technology v Wainer 1997 (9) BCLR 1225 (W).  
9  Ibid 1239G. 
10  Ibid 1239G-H. 
11  Dekker (n 1) 624-625; Protea Technology v Wainer 1240E-F. 
12  See Le Roux (n 1) 5. 
13  Act 66 of 1995.  
14  See sch 8. 
 place an obligation on 
the employer to adopt rules or codes of conduct for the workplace that will 
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create certainty and consistency. Le Roux15 notes that the rules or codes of 
conduct must be based on the needs and interests of the business or 
organisation. The employer also has a right to protect its property and interests 
and to operate an efficient and effective operation. The employer also has a 
duty to ensure that the workplace environment is safe and non-discriminatory. 
These rights and obligations must be weighed up against the rights of an 
employee.16 Our courts have upheld rules prohibiting the transmission of sexist 
and racist messages, or a rule aimed at preventing harassment.17
2 Legislation on interception and monitoring 
  
 
E-communication technology poses several risks to the employers' business. 
Employees' misuse of e-mail for private purposes may increase the employer's 
overhead costs, cause communication delays and even blockages of 
communication systems.  
 
The extent to which an employee's privacy in the work place may be limited by 
the monitoring of her e-communications is an issue of some complexity and 
debate. 
 
 
The question arises to what extent an employer may monitor whether or not 
employees are using electronic communication technologies responsibly. The 
answer lies in the interpretation of the Regulation of Interception of 
Communications and Provision of Communication-Related Information Act.18 
The Regulation of Interception Act was assented to on the 30th of December 
200219 but came into operation only at the end of September 2005.20
                                            
15  See Le Roux (n 1) 9-10. 
16  See Le Roux (n 1) 10; Bernstein v Bester 1996 2 SA 751 (CC) 789. 
17  See Bamford v Energiser (SA) [2001] 12 BALR 1251 (P) and also Cronje v Toyota 
Manufacturing [2001] 3 BALR 213 (CCMA); Le Roux (n 1) 10. 
18  Act 70 of 2002 (hereafter the "Regulation of Interception Act" or RICPCIA). Refer to s 2 of 
Regulation of Interception Act. 
19  The Bill was published early in January 2003 – see GN 122 in GG 24286 of 22 January 
2003. 
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Prior to the enactment of the Regulation of Interception Act, the Interception 
and Monitoring Prohibition Act21 was the most important statutory provision with 
regard to monitoring. The IMP Act prohibited the interception of confidential 
information, but the act was not applicable in the private sphere such as the 
workplace.22
A contravention of the provisions of the Regulation of Interception Act is a 
criminal offence
 The reach of the Regulation of Interception Act is wider than that 
of the previous IMP Act, as the act is also applicable to the private sphere. It 
prohibits the intentional interception or authorisation of an interception of any 
communication in the course of its occurrence or transmission. There are, 
however, certain exceptions, of which some are vital in the context of the 
employment relationship.  
 
Section 2 of the Regulation of Interception Act constitutes the core provision in 
this regard. It states that no person may: 
 
… intentionally intercept or attempt to intercept, or authorise or procure any other 
person to intercept or attempt to intercept at any place in the Republic, any 
communication in the course of its occurrence or transmission.  
 
23 with severe penalties.24
                                                                                                                               
20  See GN 55 in GG 28075 of 23 September 2005 which proclaimed that the Regulation of 
Interception Act will come into operation on 30 September 2005 (with the exception of s 40 
and s 62 which will only come into operation on 30 November 2005). 
21  Act 127 of 1992 (hereinafter referred to as the "IMP Act").  
22  See Beech (n 1) 650-654; Moonsamy v The Mailhouse (1999) 20 ILJ 464 (CCMA) 467-
468. Also refer to Mischke 2001 Contemporary Labour Law 92-95. See Cohen (n 1) 3-5.  
23  S 49 states that such an action constitutes a criminal offence.  
24  In terms of s 51(1)(b) the commission of such an offence could lead to the imposition of a 
fine not exceeding two million rand or a period of imprisonment not exceeding 10 years.  
  
 
The term "communication" is defined to include both "direct" and "indirect" 
communication. The term "direct communication" is of lesser importance for 
this study as it refers to actual speech or conversation between two persons 
who are in each other's presence. The definition of "indirect communication" 
found in section 1 is of greater importance. It reads as follows:  
 
 … the transfer of information, including a message or any part of a message, 
whether – 
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(a) in the form of –  
 
(i)  speech, music or other sounds; data, text, visual images, whether 
animated or not; signals; or radio frequency spectrum; or 
 
(b)  in any other form or in any combination of forms, that is transmitted in 
whole or in part by means of a postal service or a telecommunication 
system. 
 
Indirect communication includes telephone calls (land line and cellular); 
intranet, internet, facsimile facilities, private and personal e-mail messages, 
tracking devices in company cars; SMS messages and voice-mail messages. 
The downloading of information from an internet site or the sending or receiving 
of an e-mail message, or the message itself, would usually fall within the 
definition of an "indirect communication" as this would, typically, take the form 
of the transfer of information in the form of data, text or visual images, and it 
would typically be transmitted by means of a telecommunication system. 
 
The terms "telecommunications system"25, "telecommunication"26 and tele-
communication facility27 are defined in section 1 of the Telecommunications 
Act.28
                                            
25  Telecommunication system means "…any system or series of telecommunication facilities 
or radio, optical or other electromagnetic apparatus or any similar technical system used 
for the purpose of telecommunication, whether or not such telecommunication is subject to 
rearrangement, composition or other processes by any means in the course of their 
transmission or emission or reception" . 
26  The term "telecommunication" means "…the emission, transmission or reception of a 
signal from one point to another by means of electricity, magnetism, radio or other 
electromagnetic waves, or any agency of a like nature, whether with or without the aid of 
tangible conductors". 
27  The term "telecommunication facility" includes any wire, cable, antenna, mast or other 
thing which is or may be used for or in connection with telecommunication. 
28  Act 103 of 1996, as amended. 
 
 
The definition of "intercept" is found in section 1. It reads as follows:  
 
the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any communication through the 
use of any means, including an interception device, so as to make some or all of 
the contents of a communication available to a person other than the sender or 
recipient or intended recipient of that communication, and includes the (a) 
monitoring of any such communication by means of a monitoring device; (b) 
viewing, examination or inspection of the contents of any indirect communication; 
and (c) diversion of any indirect communication from its intended destination to 
any other destination. 
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Section 1 defines "to monitor" as to listen to or record communications by 
means of a monitoring device and "monitoring" has a corresponding meaning. 
A "monitoring device" is stated to be:  
 
any electronic, mechanical or other instrument, device, equipment or apparatus 
which is used or can be used, whether by itself or in combination with any other 
instrument, device, equipment or apparatus, to listen to or record any 
communication.  
 
An "interception device" is defined as: 
 
 … any electronic, mechanical or other instrument, device, equipment or apparatus 
which is used or can be used, whether by itself or in combination with any other 
instrument, device, equipment or apparatus, to intercept any communication. 
 
The meaning of intercept is important. It includes the acquisition of the contents 
of any communication through the monitoring of a communication, the viewing 
of the contents and the diversion of an indirect communication from its intended 
destination.29
No person may intentionally intercept an e-mail message in occurrence or 
transmission by using interception or monitoring devices. All activity that 
monitors the traffic on a telecommunication system is covered by section 2 of 
the Regulation of Interception Act. To monitor means to record 
communications, including the mere fact that a communication was sent or a 
site visited. Indirect communications include furthermore a message or a part 
thereof in the form of data, text, visual images (text or symbols) in the subject 
line, text or symbols in filling in recipient's address (
 At the heart of the definition of intercept is the acquisition of the 
content of the communication and to make all or some of the content available 
to a person other than the intended recipient or sender. Contents, when used 
with respect to any communication, include any information concerning the 
substance, purport or meaning of that communication. 
 
223@unisa.ac.za)) and any 
other form or combination of forms.  
 
                                            
29  The blocking or interception of e-mails at server level will thus amount to interception – 
contra Dekker (n 1).  
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It is also of interest to note that the prohibition in section 2 refers to the 
interception of a communication "in the course of its occurrence or 
transmission". This must be read with section 1(2)(a) which states that the 
interception of a communication takes place in the Republic if, and only if, the 
interception is effected by conduct within the Republic and the communication 
is either intercepted, in the case of a direct communication, in the course of its 
occurrence; or in the case of an indirect communication, in the course of its 
transmission by means of a postal communication or telecommunications 
system.  
 
 
3 Permitted interceptions 
3.1   Prior written consent 
Sections 3 to 11 of the Regulation of Interception Act set out certain 
circumstances where there will be no contravention of section 2. Section 4(1) 
provides for consensual monitoring and states that any person, other than a law 
enforcement officer, may intercept a communication if that person is a party to 
that communication. However, of most significance in this context is section 
5(1), which provides that any person may intercept any communication if one of 
the parties to the communication has given prior written consent to such 
interception. The interception is not legal where it was done for the purposes of 
committing an offence.30
Some have argued that a general consent contained in the conditions of 
employment of an employee would amount to consent in terms of section 
5(1).
  
 
31
                                            
30  See s 5(1). 
31  Beech (n 1) 656. 
 But the literal interpretation of the wording of this section, namely 
"consent in writing to such interception" may imply consent on a case-by-case 
basis. Furthermore, such blanket consent may not suffice as it may be argued 
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that the employee, when giving the consent, could not have contemplated the 
scope of the monitoring.32
The third important factor to note in the interpretation of section 5(1) is that this 
consent to monitoring may be given by only one of the parties to the 
communication. It has been argued that the word "party" in this section bears 
its ordinary meaning, which would include consent from the recipient, the 
sender or any party that is copied in the message.
  
 
33 In the case of 
communication between multi-parties, only one party to the communication 
needs to consent in writing.34
3.2   Carrying on of a business 
 If proper consent is obtained from the employee 
this requirement would have been met. 
 
An important exception is made also for the interception of communications in 
connection with the carrying on of a business. Section 6(1) states that: 
 
Any person, may, in the course of the carrying on of any business, intercept any 
indirect communication (a) by means of which a transaction is entered into in the 
course of that business; or (b) which otherwise relates to that business; or (c) 
which otherwise takes place in the course of the carrying on of that business in the 
course of its transmission over a telecommunications line.  
 
Section 6(2) then sets certain requirements that must be met before the 
interception of indirect communications in terms of section 6(1) will be 
permitted. The interception must, firstly, be with the express or implied consent 
of the "system controller"35
                                            
32  Beech (n 1) 656. 
33  Beech (n 1) 656. He also notes that there is a "potential argument" that the employer is a 
party to the communication because the employer provides the communication equipment, 
but it is submitted that the employer will not be a "party" to the communication in the 
ordinary sense of the word.  
34  Beech (n 1) 656. 
35  The term system controller is defined in s 1. In the case of a juristic person it means the 
chief executive officer or equivalent officer of the juristic person, or any person duly 
authorised by such person. 
 and the latter, secondly, must either have made all 
reasonable efforts to inform in advance all persons who intend to use the 
telecommunication system concerned of the fact that interceptions may take 
place, or the interception must take place with the express or implied consent of 
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the person who uses the telecommunication system. This telecommunications 
system must, thirdly, be provided for use "wholly or partly in connection with 
that business". Such interceptions must, lastly, be carried out for specific 
purposes, namely, to monitor or keep a record of indirect communications 
where this is done to establish the existence of certain facts,36 to investigate or 
detect the unauthorised use of the telecommunication system concerned; to 
secure the effective operation of the system or where this is done as an 
"inherent part of" the effective operation of the system;37
The aforementioned two statements are open to attack. First, section 6 applies 
not only to the employer but instead allows "any person" to intercept within the 
parameters detailed above.
 or to monitor indirect 
communications made to a confidential voice telephony counselling or support 
service in certain circumstances.  
 
Section 6 is a tremendously intricate provision. At first blush, it seems that the 
protection offered by section 6 would apply only to the clients of a business 
One may also argue that any private use by employees would not fall within the 
ambit of section 6(1) in that these indirect communications, in the course of 
being transmitted, would not facilitate the entering into a transaction in the 
course of the business, would not otherwise relate to the business, or would not 
otherwise take place in the course of the carrying on of that business.  
 
38
                                            
36  Beech (n 1) 657-658 notes that this would include the traditional recording of a transaction. 
37  According to Beech (n 1) 658 this would include the sending of spam and unusual e-mail 
traffic to and from a specific user. 
38  Note that "any person" is also used in terms of s 5. 
 Secondly, if it concerned only the employer it 
could lead to the anomaly that the employer (any person) must obtain consent 
from the employer (the systems controller) for the intended monitoring. The 
interception and monitoring of unauthorised use in terms of section 6(2)(bb), 
thirdly, could include unauthorised communications made from the office 
equipment of the employer within business hours. One could, however, argue 
that such unauthorised use relates otherwise to the business, as an employee 
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of the business makes these communications. Private use will certainly be 
unauthorised use where the employer's policy or directions say so.39
Lastly, doubt has been raised whether or not section 6 is limited to interception 
in the course of transmission.
  
 
40 This last argument maintains that interception 
may take place in terms of section 6 only if the interception is done whilst the 
communication is in the process of travelling over internet or intranet. Is it 
possible to apply this section also to the "interception" of stored messages?41
                                            
39  The monitoring or interception by employers of conversations of employees on a private 
cell phone will not be legal. However, the monitoring and interception of cell phone use will 
be legal where the employer supplies to the employee the cell phone for use in the 
business. It will also not cover the tracking of employees' cars (unless the tracking system 
was provided by the employer for use in connection with business – thus a company car's 
tracking device). 
 
Section 1(2)(b) provides that the time during which an indirect transmission is 
being communicated by means of a telecommunications system includes any 
time when the telecommunications system by means of which such indirect 
communication is being, or has been, transmitted is used for storing it in a 
manner that enables the intended recipient to collect it or otherwise have 
access to it. If one considers the definition of telecommunications system set 
out above, it would appear that the prohibition would extend to the retrieving of 
communications stored on a mail server. 
40  See Buys 2003 www.legalbrief.co.za; Buys 2003 www.estrategy.co.za. 
41  The answer is yes. S 1(2) (b) of the Regulation of Interception Act provides that the time 
during which an indirect communication is being transmitted includes time when the 
system is used for storing it in a manner that enables the recipient to collect or have 
access to it. In terms of the IMAP protocol the communication "occurs" only on the shared 
mail server and while it is there the transmission is incomplete. Where the mail system 
makes use of the POP protocol the communication will be transferred to the user's 
computer and deleted from the server. 
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4 Meeting the requirements of section 5 and section 6 of the 
Regulation of Interception Act: Introduction to the ECT Act 
4.1  Translation of the Regulation of Interception Act to the e-
environment 
Legal opinion was sharply divided on the implementation of the Regulation of 
Interception Act, specifically regarding the implementation of its sections 5 and 
6. The requirement of "written consent" in terms of section 5(1), firstly, posed 
difficulties.42 Secondly, the manner in which express or implied consent may be 
obtained from the system controller or the person who uses the 
telecommunication system has been questioned. 43 Thirdly, a heated debate 
centred on the question of what entails "all reasonable efforts to inform in 
advance" all persons who intend to use the system that interception may take 
place.44 Fourthly and lastly, doubt has been raised as to whether or not section 
6 is limited to interception in the course of transmission, namely in the process 
of travelling over the Internet or Intranet. The question has been asked if 
section 6 could possibly be applied to the "interception" of stored messages.45
Other spurious arguments that were raised and which will not be dealt with here 
were if e-mail filtering and blocking software may be considered illegal
  
 
46 and if 
employment agreements would need to be re-drafted once the RICIPIA 
becomes effective.47
                                            
42  See s 5(1). See Benn 2003 
  
 
 
www.legalbrief.co.za. See Anon 2003 www.legalbrief.co.za. 
43  See Benn (n 42) and Anon (n 42). 
44  See Sukhraj 2003 www.sundaytimes.co.za. 
45  The answer is yes. S 1(2)(b) of RICPCIA provides that the time during which an indirect 
communication is being transmitted includes time when the system is used for storing it in 
a manner that enables the recipient to collect or have access to it. In terms of the IMAP 
protocol the communication "occurs" only on the shared mail server, and while it is there 
the transmission is incomplete. Where the mail system makes use of the POP protocol the 
communication will be transferred to the user's computer and deleted from server. 
46  See Buys 2003 www.legalbrief.co.za. 
47  See Beech (n 1) 658-660; Guedes 2003 www.itweb.co.za. 
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4.2  Introduction to the ECT Act 
It is believed that the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act48 was 
enacted to remove barriers that previously hampered the validity of electronic 
consent. The ECT Act aims to remove barriers to the legal recognition of 
electronic transactions. The ECT Act came into force on the 30th of August 
2002. The ECT Act addresses a very wide spectrum of issues covering social, 
economic and political objectives. This across-the-board approach, of 
addressing almost all issues related to electronic commerce in one statute, is 
not common. It has been noted49 that time will tell whether a piecemeal, ad hoc 
approach or a sweeping pragmatic approach in reforming law is better suited to 
the logic of electronic commerce. The overall objective of the ECT Act is to 
enable and facilitate electronic transactions and to create public confidence in 
electronic transacting.50
Section 1 of the ECT Act provides that a data message means data generated, 
sent, received or stored by electronic means and includes voice, where the 
voice is used in an automated transaction
  
 
The ECT Act contains minimalist enabling provisions on contract formation. It 
seeks to remove legal barriers to e-commerce in South Africa by providing for 
functional equivalence rules in the electronic contracting context. The ECT Act 
also seeks to maximise the benefits of e-commerce by promoting universal 
affordable access to electronic communications and transactions. The ECT Act, 
importantly, facilitates the legal recognition of data messages by providing that 
the requirements of writing, signature, and contract formation may be met by 
such data messages.  
 
51 and a stored record.52
                                            
48  25 of 2002. Hereafter the ECT Act. 
49  See Kaufman and Winn 2000 ELR 567-568 who note that the US has followed a piece-
meal ad-hoc approach, whereas the EU has followed a sweeping, pragmatic approach to 
law reform in response to technological innovation. Also refer to Pappas 2002 Denver JILP 
325, 328-331. 
50  See s 2(1)(c)-(f), (i)-(o); also refer to Wood-Bodley SALJ 526 for comments on the ECT 
Act. 
51  It is unclear why "voice" is confined to automated transactions. 
52  The definition of "data message" in the Model Law also refers to "optical" and "digital" 
means of communication. 
 "Data" is 
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defined as electronic representations of information of any kind and electronic 
communication as a communication by means of data messages. The meaning 
of the term "electronic" is central to both the meaning of "data" and the meaning 
of "data message". "Electronic" was defined in the ECT Bill to mean digital or 
other intangible form. This definition was, however, found inadequate and was 
deleted from the amended ECT Bill.53
Section 3
  
 
54
Section 11(2) also provides that information is not without legal force and effect 
merely on the grounds that it is not contained in the data message purporting to 
 is extremely important in that it confirms that the ECT Act applies to 
the common law as well as to all existing legislation except where its 
application is specifically excluded. Section 3 confirms that pre-existing 
(current) law also apply to the matters outlined in the ECT Act. Party autonomy 
is retained and whilst the ECT Act merely facilitates e-communications, no-one 
may insist on the use of an electronic transaction. Entities may furthermore lay 
down their own requirements, including specific forms, format and standards to 
be utilised, where they are prepared to use electronic transactions.  
 
4.3  Legal recognition of data messages 
Part 1 of Chapter III of the ECT Act provides for the legal recognition of data 
messages and records. Section 11(1) of the ECT Act provides that information 
is not without legal force and effect merely on the grounds that it is wholly or 
partly in the form of a data message. Section 11 embodies the fundamental 
principle that there should be no disparity of treatment between data messages 
and paper documents. The form in which certain information is presented or 
retained cannot be used as the only reason for which that information is denied 
legal effectiveness, validity or enforceability. 
 
4.4  Incorporation by reference 
                                            
53  See ECT Bill B8 of 2002 (as amended). 
54  S 3 of the ECT Act provides: "This Act must not be interpreted so as to exclude any 
statutory law or the common law from being applied to, recognising or accommodating 
electronic transactions, data messages or any other matter provided for in this Act". 
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give rise to such legal force and effect, but is merely referred to in such a data 
message. The expression "incorporation by reference" is often used as a 
concise means of describing situations where a document refers generically to 
provisions which are detailed elsewhere, rather than reproducing them in full. 
 
The objective test of incorporation by reference, as paraphrased in the recent 
case of Durban's Water Wonder Land v Botha,55 comprises of three elements, 
namely: first, would the reasonable person have expected terms and conditions 
of that nature at a resort of that nature? Secondly, were the terms and 
conditions displayed where one would have reasonably expected them to be 
displayed, in various languages and in clear and eligible print? Thirdly, were the 
terms and conditions what may reasonably have been expected, given the 
nature of the activities?56
                                            
55  1999 1 All SA 411 (A). 
56  Also refer to Haupt The pudding is in the proof 15. 
  
 
The translation of these requirements to the on-line world could be – would the 
reasonable user have expected terms and conditions of that nature as being 
applicable to that message? Secondly, were the terms and conditions displayed 
where one would have reasonably expected them to be displayed, in various 
languages and in clear and eligible print? Thirdly, were the terms and 
conditions what may reasonably have been expected, given the nature of the 
activities? 
 
However, new and different standards for incorporation by reference have been 
created in section 11(3), which could cause confusion. Section 11(3) embodies 
the common-law approach but adds the requirement that the information to be 
incorporated needs to be available to the other party online. Uniform resource 
locators (URLs), which direct the reader to the referenced document, may, for 
example, be embedded in a message. Such URLs can provide "hypertext links" 
allowing the reader to use a pointing device (such as a mouse) to select a key 
word associated with a URL. The referenced text would then be displayed.  
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In assessing the accessibility of the referenced text, factors to be considered 
may include: availability (the hours of operation of the repository and the ease 
of access); the cost of access; integrity (verification of content, authentication of 
the sender, and a mechanism for communication error correction); and the 
extent to which the referenced text is subject to later amendment (notice of 
updates; notice of policy of amendment). It has been noted that section 11(3) 
should be abolished, as it increases the common-law burden of incorporation 
by reference.57
Section 12 makes reference to the phrase "in law". The precise ambit of this 
"law" and its scope of application create uncertainty. Following the UNCITRAL 
Model Law,
 
 
4,5  The requirement of a written notice of intended interception and 
monitoring 
The requirement of a written consent or the giving of a written consent may also 
be communicated electronically. Section 12 of the ECT Act provides that a 
requirement in law that a document or information must be in writing is met if 
the document or information is (a) in the form of a data message; and (b) 
accessible in a manner usable for subsequent reference. This section is 
intended to define the basic standard to be met by a data message in order to 
satisfy a requirement that information be retained or presented "in writing" or 
that it be contained in a "document" or other paper-based instrument.  
 
The information in a data message must be accessible so as to be usable for 
subsequent reference. Here "usable" includes human and/or computer use and 
"accessible" is meant to imply that information in the form of computer data 
should be readable and interpretable, and that the software that might be 
necessary to render such information readable should be retained.  
 
58
                                            
57  Haupt (n 56) 14-16. 
 such a term is likely to be interpreted to refer not only to statutory, 
regulatory and common law, but also to judicial precedent, procedural and 
58  See UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce 1996 with additional art 5bis as 
adopted in 1998; see also Hill and Walden 1996 www.batnet.com; see Oyarzábal 2004 U 
Miami Inter-Am L Rev 499. 
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subordinate law.59 In terms of the wording of section 12 one has to conclude 
that where parties to an agreement require an amendment of the agreement or 
a notice in terms of the agreement, that requirement will not be met by a data 
message.60 This is problematic. Reference is also made to "law" in other 
sections of the ECT Act.61
Section 24 is aimed at data messages that relate not to the conclusion of 
contracts but to the performance of contractual obligations (e.g., notice of 
defective goods, an offer to pay, and notice of the place where a contract would 
be performed, recognition of debt). As is the case with section 22, section 24 
does not impose the use of electronic means of communication but validates 
such use. It should not be used as a basis to impose on the addressee the 
legal consequences of a message, if the use of a non-paper-based method for 
its transmission comes as a surprise to the addressee. Clearly, where the 
employer makes use of the electronic environment to convey information to her 
employees on the use of computer equipment and networks, the use of such a 
  
 
4.6  Electronic expression of consent to interception and monitoring 
Section 24 of the ECT Act provides that an expression of intent or other 
statement as between the originator and the addressee of a data message is 
not without legal force and effect merely on the grounds that—(a) it is in the 
form of a data message; or (b) it is not evidenced by an electronic signature but 
by other means from which the person's intent or other statement can be 
inferred. Section 22 provides for the general rule that contracts can be 
concluded in electronic form. Section 24 makes provision for the valid 
expression of the offer and acceptance segments of contract formation as well 
as unilateral "statements" (subsection (1)). Subsection (2) is designed to 
include statutory recognition of the click-wrap and web-wrap mechanisms for 
expressing intent, but is nevertheless open-ended and neutral.  
 
                                            
59  Meiring "Electronic Transactions" 83. 
60  Haupt (n 56) 9 argues correctly that an agreement between two parties cannot be elevated 
to "the law" – it merely has effect in law. S 12 only affects statutory requirements of writing 
as the common law does not prescribe formality requirements.  
61  See, eg, s 12, 13(1), 14(1), 16(1), 17(1), etc. 
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non-paper-based method for its transmission will not come as a surprise. The 
use of the electronic environment will rather be viewed as natural and logical. 
 
4.7 Electronic signing 
The ECT Act defines an electronic signature as data which is attached to, 
incorporated in, or logically associated with other data, and which is intended 
by the user to serve as a signature. Legal recognition is therefore afforded to 
any method of signing an electronic documents or message, including anything 
from a password to a scanned "wet" signature.  
 
Section 13(2) provides that an electronic signature is not without legal force and 
effect merely on the ground that it is in electronic form. Electronic signatures 
can thus take a variety of forms and, depending on the nature of the 
transaction, could range between simply writing a name at the end of e-mail to 
the use of complex biometric-identification technologies. Alongside "advanced 
electronic signatures" based on public key cryptography, there are various 
other devices which may currently be used, or considered for future use, with a 
view to fulfilling in one or more of the functions of a handwritten signature. For 
example, certain techniques would rely on authentication through a biometric 
device, where samples of the identifier would have been previously analysed 
and stored by the biometric device. 
 
Furthermore, section 13(5) of the ECT Act stipulates that any other expression 
of intent or statement is not without legal force and effect merely on the 
grounds that—(a) it is in the form of a data message; or (b) it is not evidenced 
by an electronic signature but is evidenced by other means from which such 
person's intent or other statement can be inferred.62
                                            
62  See s 13(5). 
 Parties to a contract may 
thus agree to use a method other than an electronic signature, to express intent 
or consent. Electronic agreements may thus be validly concluded through "click 
wrap agreements" by clicking on the "I agree" icon, or by expressing intent to 
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be bound through passwords or any other method from which such intent can 
be inferred.  
 
 
5 ECT Act and compliance with the Regulation of Interception Act 
5.1  Prior written consent 
First, the requirement of prior written consent in terms of section 5(1) will also 
not pose a problem. In terms of section 12, section 13(5) and section 24(2) of 
the ECT Act, written consent may be given electronically. The requirement of 
"prior consent" will be met with ease if the giving of such consent is conditional 
for obtaining access to the work station or other telecommunication equipment.  
 
5.2  Reasonable steps to inform 
Compliance with the requirements of section 6(2) of the RICIPIA, namely, that 
the systems controller has made all reasonable efforts to inform in advance all 
persons who intend to use the telecommunications system concerned of the 
fact that interceptions may take place, will also be facilitated by the ECT Act. It 
is submitted that it is relatively easy to electronically take reasonable steps to 
inform.  
 
The ECT Act facilitates this process by affording the employer the opportunity 
to incorporate her e-mail policy63 on the welcoming page when employees log 
on. A clear reference to www.emailpolicy@tana.com will suffice. This notice 
may be displayed every time an employee logs on to the employer's computer 
facilities.  
                                            
63  This should of course contain reference to the monitoring and interception of electronic 
communications. See McGregor (n1) 647-650 and Van Jaarsveld (n 1) 663-665 for a 
discussion of the issues to be addressed in the e-mail policy. Also refer to Basset 2003 
www.fmew.com. 
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5.3 Express or implied consent 
Compliance with the requirements of section 6(2), namely that the interception 
must take place with the express or implied consent of the person who uses the 
telecommunications system, will once again be facilitated with ease by the ECT 
Act. Incorporation by reference would again prove to be helpful. A standard 
notice to this effect may also be incorporated in all e-mail messages that are 
generated or forwarded by the system, which will suffice as notice to third 
parties. 
 
Obtaining implied consent from the user will be facilitated by sections 11(2) of 
the ECT Act. The implied consent of a user will be obtained where the 
employer incorporates her e-mail policy in the welcoming screen of the 
employee's workstation. A clear reference to www.emailpolicy@tana.com will 
suffice. This notice may be displayed every time an employee logs on to the 
employer's computer facilities. The employer may also take one further step to 
ensure compliance with the Regulation of Interception Act. Users may be 
required to access a link containing the necessary information prior to obtaining 
access to the intranet.  
 
Obtaining express consent from the user will be facilitated by sections 11(2), 
13(5) and 24(2) of the ECT Act. For express consent users may be required to 
access a link containing the necessary information and to click that they give 
consent to such activities by clicking on an icon prior to obtaining access to the 
intranet or prior to using the workstation.  
 
6 Conclusion 
It would seem as though compliance with the Regulation of Interception Act is 
no Pandora's Box after all. The Regulation of Interception Act's requirements of 
written consent, taking reasonable steps to inform and obtaining express or 
implied consent may all be met with ease. The ECT Act's provisions enable 
employers to integrate these requirements with that of workstation use. It is 
merely a question of knowing your links and clicks. 
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